We develop a stochastic model to rank di erent policies (tax, fixed cap and relative cap) according to their expected total social costs. Three types of uncertainties are taken into account: uncertainty about abatement costs, businessas-usual (BAU) emissions and future economic output (the two latter being correlated). Two parameters: the ratio of slopes of marginal benefits and marginal costs, and the above-mentioned correlation, are crucial to determine which instrument is preferred.
Introduction
At the Durban UNFCCC conference of the parties in 2011, the international community agreed on limiting the mean temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius with respect to pre-industrial level. While there is an agreement on this long-term goal, there is much debate on the design of the policy mechanisms to achieve this objective. International negotiations are at a standstill, and the potential successor of the top-down Kyoto protocol is likely to be a minimal agreement, leaving room to countries to implement their own climate policies in a bottom-up architecture (Rayner, 2010) .
For cost-e ectiveness reasons, economists advocate emissions pricing for abatement, in the form of a tax (price instrument) or tradable permits (quantity instrument), rather than command-and-control regulation. Following the seminal paper of Weitzman (1974) , a considerable literature has developed, comparing these two instruments or hybrid systems in terms of administrative costs, political acceptance and the way they address uncertainties, among others (Goulder and Schein, 2013) .
For climate change mitigation, this Weitzman argument favors the carbon tax, since there is an important inertia of accumulation of carbon emissions in the atmosphere, so the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal benefit curve (Hoel and Karp, 2002; Newell and Pizer, 2003) . However, tradable permits have been the most frequent chosen option among the few carbon pricing pioneers such as the European Union in 2005, New Zealand in 2008 or California in 2012. At the federal level of the United States, the prevailing view has been that a tax was a political taboo (Newell and Pizer, 2008; Webster et al., 2010) . However, this option may now attract decision makers as a part of a broader tax reform (Goulder and Schein, 2013) .
In a cap-and-trade system, the level of emissions is fixed, and the price of the allowance varies and is therefore uncertain. This may induce two potential problems (Conte Grand, 2013) linked to "twin uncertainties" (Kim and Baumert, 2002) . In case of higher than expected economic activity, the soaring of abatement costs constitutes an "economic risk". Conversely, during an economic recession, emissions may be greater in the presence of a cap-and-trade scheme than without any policy, which represents an "environmental risk". Then, if there is a demand for allowances in other regions or other sectors, "hot air" is generated leading to unjustified rent such as in the Former Soviet Union within the context of the Kyoto protocol. Otherwise, a surplus of allowances makes the allowance price plummet like in the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). As the uncertainty of abatement costs federates opposition to climate policies and so bear political costs, decision makers have given more importance to the economic risk. However, the severe crisis of the EU ETS threatening its very existence made a case for the second problem and attracted the attention of policy makers.
To cope with these issues, some authors have proposed a price cap, also known as "safety valve" (Jacoby and Ellerman, 2004; Webster et al., 2010) or to replace a fixed cap by an "intensity target", where the cap of emissions is indexed on the gross domestic product. Argentina proposed such a cap in 1999 (Barros and Grand, 2002) and after its opposition to sign the Kyoto protocol, the Bush administration announced in February 2002 a decrease in emissions intensity by 2012 of 18% compared to 2002
1 . While advocating for intensitybased caps at the international level, Chinese o cials opted for absolute caps in their pilot ETS projects (Ecofys, 2013; Wang, 2013) . The main case for intensity targets is to foster the participation of developing countries (Baumert et al., 1999; Frankell, 1999) which fear that climate policies would stifle their economic development. At the company level, an indexed regulation would act as a production subsidy and thereby generate an ine cient allocation of resources (Dudek and Golub, 2003; Fischer, 2003; Holland, 2012) . This argument is justified for policies like the phasing out of lead in gasoline, when the index is taken into account in firms' decisions. However as noted in Sue Wing et al. (2006) , a nationwide intensity target would not have the same e ect on firms production processes, as GDP is not considered in firms' decisions and economic growth is pursued by countries for its own sake.
As categorized by Marschinski and Lecocq (2006) , there are two strands of literature comparing the e ectiveness of the di erent economic instruments under uncertainty. The first one is derived from Weitzman (1974) "price versus quantities" article and is reasoning in terms of welfare, weighting environmental benefits against abatement costs. As mentioned, in this framework, authors advocate for the superiority of the carbon tax (Newell and Pizer, 2003) . Quirion (2005) extended this approach to indexed regulation with a stochastic analytical model featuring uncertainty in business-as-usual emissions and in the slope of the marginal abatement curve. He found that intensity targets ranked better than price instrument when uncertainty in abatement costs was high. Newell and Pizer (2008) reexamined this problem with an additive uncertainty in abatement cost and a correlation between shocks in abatement costs and economic activity (Quirion (2005) had a multiplicative uncertainty and an implicit perfect correlation). They found that the ranking of policies depended on parameters describing the first and second moment of the index and the ex post optimal quantity level.
The second strand of literature studies the impact of the di erent policies on uncertainties of di erent policy variables, mainly uncertainty in abatement. Sue Wing et al. (2006) established a formula to rank intensity targets over absolute targets (if the correlation coe cient of shocks on GDP and business-as-usual (BAU) emissions is greater than a parameter-dependent threshold, intensity targets are preferred). An equivalent condition was obtained by Marchinski and Lecocq (2006) in a more generalized version and in Marschinski and Edenhofer (2010) . Jotzo and Pezzey (2007) obtained a di erent condition due to a di erent framework 2 , but the general idea was identical: the more emissions and GDP are linked the better intensity targets compared to absolute targets. The purpose of this paper is to extend Newell and Pizer's model so as to unify these two strands of literature. For this we consider three types of uncertainty: uncertainty in abatement costs, BAU emissions and future economic output. Only the latter two uncertainties are correlated. In this more general context, we confirm Weitzman's result that prices are preferred to quantities when marginal benefits are relatively flat compared to marginal costs, and that intensity targets are preferred to absolute targets when the correlation of uncertainty in emissions and economic output is greater than a parameter-dependent threshold. An intermediary condition is obtained to compare a tax and intensity cap. Further, we are able to compare our results to the literature which minimizes the variance of abatement costs, including Sue Wing et al. (2006) , and show that reasoning in terms of abatement costs only and setting environmental benefits aside introduces a bias supporting relative caps, but that this bias is small in the case of climate change mitigation.
We then estimate the model for seven di erent regions (China, the United States, Europe, India, Russia, Brazil and Japan) using past GDP and emissions data, and International Energy Outlook forecasting. There is a high uncertainty in the value of model parameters which are sensitive to the estimation method. However some relatively robust findings can be drawn. First, the price instrument is preferred to absolute or relative caps. Second, relative caps are preferred to fixed caps in the US and emerging countries (except Brazil where it is ambiguous), whereas fixed cap are preferred to relative cap in Europe and Japan.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the model which is used for the price versus quantities problem in Section 3. Next, section 4 studies intensity targets. Empirical estimation of the model is given in section 5. Proofs are in the Appendix.
The model
The total environmental costs (TEC) depend on the level of emissions:
while the total abatement costs (TAC) are a function of abatementẽ b ≠ e wherẽ e b are business-as-usual emissions i.e. emissions without a price on emissions (parameters with a tilde are random variables).
Abatement costs are uncertain through a random additive shock in marginal cost:c 1 = c 1 +Á c , withÁ c , random variable of zero mean and standard deviation ‡ c . Business as usual emissions are uncertain in a similar way,ẽ b = e b 0 +Á e , withÁ e , random variable of zero mean and standard deviation ‡ e .
We do not model uncertainties in marginal environmental costs as in this framework they do not influence the instruments ranking (they would matter only if correlated to abatement costs (Stavins, 1996) , and there are no obvious arguments for suspecting such a correlation in the case of greenhouse gases).
Quadratic functions are a simplification to facilitate the tractability of the model and could be considered as approximations of real functions near arbitrary points (Weitzman, 1974) . Uncertainties are modeled in an additive way for tractability and to be comparable to the post-Weitzman literature. The total social costs are then:
Developping and sorting the di erent terms, we have:
For each policy instrument, we look for the policy variable (which could be the carbon price, the fixed cap or relative cap) that minimizes the expected total social costs. Then we calculate the di erences of expected total social costs for pair-wise comparison of policies, rank the policies according to key parameters and represent the best policy in a two-dimension diagram.
Price versus Quantities revisited

Quantity instrument (Q)
The expected total social costs depending on emission level e are
It is a quadratic function of e with a positive coe cient for e 2 so it has a unique minimum. The optimal cap minimizing expected total social costs is:
(the second formulation using two adimensional parameters b 2 c 2 and
is useful in the rest of the paper 3 ) Proposition 1. Using the quantity instrument Q, the cap set is identical to the cap set if there were no uncertainty.
Proof. e ú does not depend on parameters ‡ c or ‡ e . This is the "uncertainty equivalence" of Weitzman (1974) . The cap is biding (e ú < e . We suppose that it is the case. The relationship between emissions and carbon price (allowance price in case of a quantity instrument or value of the tax in case of a price instrument) is as follows: the carbon price equals the marginal abatement cost at the emissions level:
In the case of a quantity instrument, emissions are equal to the (ex ante) optimal emissions level e ú and then:
In case of a quantity instrument, emissions are capped but the allowance price is not known in advance. Once the cap is fixed, a positive cost shock or a positive BAU emissions shock increase the allowance price necessary to achieve it because these shocks induce a larger than expected abatement. Would they be known in advance (optimal policy, see further), the cap would have been set higher to trade o reduced abatement costs and increased environmental costs.
Price instrument (P)
Replacing e by p thanks to equation (5) in T SC e and minimizing expected total social costs leads to (see detailed proof in AppendixB):
The corresponding emissions are
We have the relationships:
3 Specifically, instead of 10 dimensional parameters: 
Optimal policy (O)
We can define the ex post optimal policy for both the quantity and the price instrument as in Newell and Pizer (2008) . The optimal cap is
and the optimal price is
Then ifÁ c andÁ e are positive:
And vice-versa if they are negative.
Comparison of P, Q and O
To compare instruments we compare the minimum expected total social costs 4 .
Proposition 3. (Weitzman's result) . The price instrument P performs better than the quantity instrument Q if marginal environmental costs are flatter than marginal abatement costs:
Proof. As we reason in terms of social costs (and not in terms of benefits or welfare), a policy is preferred to another when expected total social costs are lower (so when the di erence of expected total social costs are negative, e.g
This is the classical Weitzman criterion (Weitzman, 1974) . The magnitude of the di erence in expected total social costs between the two policies depends on uncertainty in incurred costs (( ‡ 2 c + c 2 2 ‡ 2 e )): the bigger it is and the larger is the di erence. Uncertainty in incurred costs come from both uncertainty in marginal abatement costs ( ‡ c ) and uncertainty of future baseline emissions ( ‡ e ) which determine the abatement needed to meet the target (Marschinski and Edenhofer, 2010) . Uncertainty in BAU emissions and uncertainty in abatement costs are commensurate, the former being "converted" into the latter through the marginal abatement cost curve. The steeper is the curve (c 2 high), the greater is the impact of uncertainty in BAU emissions into uncertainty in incurred costs.
The criterion to prefer tax or trading remains the same compared to Newell and Pizer (2008) , but the di erence in expected total social costs are larger because of the additional term c 2 2 ‡ 2 e . Numerical estimations (see part 5.2) lead to the conclusion that in terms of incurred costs uncertainty, BAU emissions uncertainty matters more than structural abatement costs uncertainty (c 2 ‡ e > ‡ c ). Pezzey and Jotzo (2012) find similar observation in their multi-party numerical model incorporating these two uncertainties: the inclusion of BAU emissions uncertainty increases the tax versus trading advantage by a factor 40. This point gives a justification for the introduction of BAU emissions uncertainty compared to Newell and Pizer (2008) model 5 .
We can compare P and Q to the ex post optimal policy O:
Proposition 4. The bigger uncertainties on abatement costs and/or BAU emissions, the larger the advantage of O over P and Q.
Proof. Because of the factor ( ‡
, the greater ‡ c or ‡ e , the bigger the di erence in total expected social costs.
Relative cap
Relative cap (R)
In this policy (called relative cap, indexed regulation or intensity target in the literature), the cap is set proportionally to the future economic outputx (in the case of nationwide climate policies,x is the gross domestic product) through a ratio r: e = rx. The future economic output is uncertain, wherex = x b 0 +Á x , with Á x random variable of zero mean and standard deviation ‡ x .
Uncertainty in economic output is correlated to uncertainty in BAU emis-
and
(and in the rest of the paper we note
). Indeed, uncertainty in BAU emissions depends on future economic output but not only, in particular the type of economic development (predominance of services or industry) and the energy mix matter as well (Kim and Baumert, 2002) . We suppose that fl ex > 0 (although theoretical formulations would also work for fl ex AE 0).
Replacing e by r(x b 0 +Á x ) in T SC e , taking the mean and minimizing with respect to r leads to the optimal rate of intensity target (see proof in AppendixC):
Contrary to the fixed cap, the relative cap is not equivalent to the one chosen if there was no uncertainty (which would be r ú = e Indeed, the larger fl ex , the more future economic output is a good proxy for future BAU emissions, and then it is not necessary to set a more stringent cap to hedge against unexpectedly high future BAU emissions. 
Relative or
Proof. See AppendixD
As in Quirion (2005) , the comparison between absolute and relative caps does not depend on uncertainty in abatement costs. In this framework it depends only on uncertainty in future BAU emissions, uncertainty in future economic output, and their correlation. A strong correlation between the two or a high uncertainty in BAU emissions favors relative caps, while a high uncertainty in future economic output favors fixed caps 6 .
This condition applies only if caps (relative or absolute) are set at their optimal level. If we compare expected total social costs of the two policies for any "comparable target " (like in Marschinski and Edenhofer (2010) 
We use the notationsR andQ instead of R and Q to symbolize suboptimality 7 (R ≤R and Q ºQ with equivalence if and only if r target = r ú and e target = e ú respectively). Relative caps are favored over absolute caps when: (i) uncertainty in future economic output is low (ii) uncertainty in future BAU emissions is large (ii) the correlation between the two is high (iii) the target is stringent compared to BAU emissions (iv) the ratio of slopes of marginal environmental and marginal abatement costs is low.
The last point is a specificity of this model. Indeed the previous condition can be rewritten as follows:
These formulas can be compared, converting the notations, to those of Sue Wing et al. (2006) formula (18) Marschinski and Lecocq (2006) proposition 1 for "pure" intensity target fl ex > 1 2
In these papers the studied criteria is the variance of abatement (and therefore abatement costs) while environmental costs are left aside. These conditions di er from (13) and (14) only by a factor 1+ b 2 c 2 supporting relative caps. Indeed, the reduction of the variance of environmental costs provided by the fixed target is accounted for in our model but not in an "abatement costs only" framework. So taking into account abatement costs only and setting aside environmental benefits introduces a bias favoring relative caps over fixed cap. The larger the 7 If e target = e ú , the "comparable" relative target is r target = e ú x b 0 (which is di erent than r ú , so suboptimal Pizer, 2005) , so that this bias would be very low.
Prices vs relative caps
We now compare P and R. Proposition 8. The price instrument P is preferable to the relative cap R when correlation between uncertainty in future economic output and uncertainty in future BAU emissions (fl ex ) is lower than a parameter dependent threshold, depending among other on the ratio of slopes of marginal environmental and marginal abatement costs.
with
Proof. See AppendixE
Diagram
Instead of the 10 dimensional parameters
, ‡ x and ‡ ex ; we have shown that all the results can be expressed as a function of 6 adimensional parameters:
, ‹ c , ‹ e , and ‹ x . The first one, b 2 c 2 , could be called the Weitzman criterion (ratio of slopes of marginal costs and abatement). If it is lower than one, P is preferred to Q. The second one is the correlation of future economic output and future BAU emissions, which has a crucial role in the e ciency of the R instrument. The third one,
, is more di cult to figure out, but can be considered as negligible compared to one 9 , so 8 If this ratio is greater than 1, quantity instrument is preferred 9 Indeed, if we consider that marginal abatement costs near total abatement (or zero emissions) ( it has no influence on the results (because it is the term
) which is involved in formulas). Finally, the other ones, ‹ c , ‹ e and ‹ x , correspond to normalized values of the magnitude of uncertainty in future abatement costs, future BAU emissions, and future economic output.
Except for the P -Q comparison (P º Q … b 2 c 2 < 1), more than two parameters are involved in the R-Q and R-P comparisons, so representing the optimal policy in a 2-axis diagram is not straightforward. As fl
] does not depend on the ratio b 2 c 2 , we represent the optimal policy in the diagram ( b 2 c 2 ,fl ex ), other parameters being fixed. Then, in a second time, we see how change in the magnitude of uncertainty in abatement, future economic output, and BAU emissions (‹ c , ‹ x and ‹ e ) modify the diagram.
We do not consider a change in the parameter
because of its little influence. Simplification of formulas is given in AppendixA with this approximation, and in the empirical section this approximation are also undertaken (saving the estimation of b 1 , c 1 and b 2 ).
Results are presented in Figure 1 . The comparison of P and Q on one hand, and R and Q on the other hand, are direct:
respectively. An intermediate condition is found to compare P and R thanks to the previous section. The frontier between R and P is a decreasing function of b 2 c 2 which is equal to fl on ‹ c , ‹ e and ‹ x , we only dicuss changes in the Q ≠ R and P ≠ R frontiers. Uncertainty in abatement costs (‹ c ), BAU emissions (‹ e ) and economic output (‹ x ) have the following e ects on the optimal policy diagram:
• An increase of uncertainty in abatement costs (‹ c ) has no e ect on the Q ≠ R comparison, but supports P over R, especially when the ratio b 2 c 2 is low.
• For the R ≠ Q frontier: an increase of uncertainty in BAU emissions (‹ e ) favors R over Q, and on the contrary an increase of uncertainty in economic output (‹ x ) favors R over Q.
• For the R ≠ P frontier, things are clear when the ratio b 2 c 2 is relatively high (closer to 1 than 0): an increase of uncertainty in BAU emissions (‹ e ) supports R over P , and on the contrary an increase of uncertainty in economic output favors (‹ x ) P over R. The situation can be opposite when b 2 c 2 decreases, but it depends on the specific values of ‹ c , ‹ e and ‹ x .
Empirical application
Contrary to the Kyoto Protocol, the architecture of post-Kyoto international agreements is likely to be bottom-up: most likely, countries or groups of countries will decide a target to achieve and will be free to decide the instrument to achieve this target (for the instruments that concern us in this article: price instrument, absolute or relative caps). In terms of timing, these targets are likely to apply after 2020. Based on the EU ETS, a period of five years before rules can be changed seems reasonable.
10 With the expression (F.7) in AppendixF (and the simplification), when b 2 c 2 = 0, the
shows that it is always superior to one for x an y values between 0 and 1. As the frontier is a decreasing function with a value > 1 in 0, and a value < 1 in 1, it reaches 1 for a value of b 2 c 2 comprised between 0 and 1.
Therefore, we empirically test our model for the period 2020-2025 and for seven countries 11 which represented two thirds of world CO 2 emissions in 2010:
China, the United States, Europe 12 , India, Russia 13 , Brazil and Japan.
Estimation of parameters ‹ e , ‹ x and fl ex
Both future GDP and BAU emissions are highly uncertain and cannot be predicted with accuracy, especially over the medium term. Further, if there is a consensus that emissions and economic output are not independent, there is much debate around the nature of their interaction. The Environmental Kuznets Curve (Grossman and Krueger, 1995) implies an inverted U-shaped relationship between pollution and economic development, but its validity, especially for carbon emissions, has been more and more criticized (Stern, 2004) .
However in our case it is not the relationship between absolute values of BAU emissions and GDP that is relevant, but the correlation of their forecasting errors. We then need to estimate forecasting errors of emissions and GDP under a common framework to estimate ‹ e , ‹ x , and their correlation fl ex .
A first option would be to gather estimates of GDP and BAU emissions for 2020-2025 in di erent models, consider the mean as the reference value, and compute variances in results, like in Marschinski and Lecocq (2006) . On the contrary, we choose to estimate these parameters by confronting past forecasting results on real data (historical forecasting error). An evident advantage of this method is that (if we consider that measurement errors are negligible) the reference values, Few institutions forecast both GDP and CO 2 emissions for fossil fuel combustion on a yearly basis. It is the case of the US Energy Administration with its International Energy Outlook (IEO Year 2005 and year 2010 are very di erent in terms of forecasting: the economic crisis after 2008 was certainly not anticipated. We consider that it is a good thing for our numerical analysis: ‹ x , ‹ e and fl ex , which are mean and correlation of random variables, are better estimated when a wide range of possibilities is considered. However, knowing if considering estimations based on "common" or crisis year (2005 or 2010) only would totally change the results is a legitimate question. Separated results of estimations based on "common" or crisis year are given in see AppendixG. In the rest of the paper we make particular attention to the robustness of the mentioned results.
Despite its simplicity, the Trend forecast performs better at predicting GDP
18
(except for Russia). However the IEO forecasts are more accurate for emissions (except for the US, Russia and India). For the IEO forecasts, the errors are larger in GDP predictions than in emissions, whereas they are in the same order of magnitude for the Trend forecasts. For Europe however, as half of emissions have been covered by the Emission Trading Scheme since 2005, emissions cannot technically be considered as business-as-usual. Individual values remain quite sensitive to the method employed. In order to give stylized facts, we split the countries into two groups: BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and Western countries (Europe, the United States and Japan), and make a double averaging, by group of countries and by forecasting method (IEO and Trend). Results are visible in Table 2 .
Three observations can be made (these observations are still valid for separated estimations based on "common" or crisis year):
• Forecasting errors are greater in magnitude for BRIC countries both in GDP and in emissions:
• Forecasting errors of emissions and GDP are in the same order of magnitude for BRIC countries, whereas GDP are comparatively more uncertain than emissions for Western countries:
• Forecasting errors are much more correlated for BRIC countries than for Western countries:
These three observations favor fixed caps for Western countries and relative caps for BRIC countries. To confirm these findings, we reason from now on for individual regions/countries.
Based on 4.2, using the approximation |c 1 ≠b 1 | π c 2 e b 0 (see part AppendixA), when targets are set at their optimal level, relative caps are preferred to fixed caps, when the following ratio
is superior to one. If we want to compare policies when they are not at their optimal level (but comparable i.e. e target = r target x b 0 ), the relevant ratio is:
When reasoning in terms of uncertainty of abatement, like in Sue Wing et al. (2006) (and Lecocq (2006) and Marschinski and Edenhofer (2010) which are equivalent),R ºQ …K > 1. But if we reason in terms of welfare,R ºQ …K > 1 + b 2 c 2 (see part 4.2).
However, because (i) the ratio b 2 c 2 is significantly lower than one (ii) uncertainties regarding the key parameters are high; these di erences (optimality/non optimality and abatement/welfare) can be neglected in the light of this numerical analysis when comparing R and Q 19 .
19 Indeed we have:
. For respective values of
In order to give results as robust as possible in the light of the various estimations of (‹ x , ‹ e and fl ex ); we compute two ratios for each country, picking whichever value of IEO or Trend supporting fixed caps (‹ x high, ‹ e and fl ex low) or relative caps (‹ x low, ‹ e and fl ex high). Results are reported on Table 3 . 
Estimation of ‹ c
We do not consider di erentiated abatement costs per country but base our estimates on global abatement simulated by CGE models, because there is no consistent multi-model ensemble of estimates for our seven countries/regions . Abatement costs are derived from the Energy Modeling Forum 21 (Weyant, 2006) . For 18 di erent models, we gather: (i) the percentage of emissions reduction in 2025 for the fossil fuel/cement sector (compared to the reference case) in the CO 2 only scenario (found in Table 5 of Weyant (2006) ), noted A, and the carbon permit price (in G $ 2000/tCO 2 eq (found in Table 15 of (Weyant, 2006) converting carbon into carbon dioxide), noted P . Estimates are reported in Figure 3 .
In the model we have (see equation (5)):
In these CGE models, the price of the carbon permit equals the marginal cost of abatement, so we perform the linear regression: Is it reasonable to use this estimation based on a global level for all the di erent regions? As in the models, the less costly mitigation options are used first, an absolute emission reduction at the global level is then less costly than at the regional level, so c 2 is likely to be larger for smaller geographical entities. However, e b 0 is also smaller, so the e ect on the product c 2 e b 0 is undetermined. Further, errors in the assessment of abatement costs can compensate at the global level, therefore it is likely that ‡ c is higher for smaller geographical entities. Altogether, we consider that ‹ c =3% is a low bound estimation of abatement costs uncertainty, and consider a double of this estimate (6%) as well in the following.
We are now able to compare values of ‹ c and ‹ e for di erent configurations (see Table 4 ). We compute the ratio (
(as it appears several time in part 3) for a high (31.5%) and low (6%) value of ‹ e 20 and a high (6%) and low (3%) value of ‹ c . We recall that if this ratio is lower than one, it means that in terms of incurred costs uncertainty, BAU emissions uncertainty matters more than structural abatement costs uncertainty. As for all configurations, ‹ e Ø ‹ c , it was straightforward that this ratio was lower or equal to one (and so that BAU emissions uncertainty had the biggest impact on incurred cost uncertainty). In case of important emissions costs uncertainty is negligible in incurred costs uncertainty.
Around the ratio
b 2 c 2 To compare tax and intensity target, we consider the inverse problem. For high and low values of ‹ x , ‹ e , fl ex and ‹ c , we compute the limit value of the b 2 c 2 ratio which makes P and R equivalent 21 . The damages caused by carbon emissions are much more uncertain than abatement costs. The most recent IPCC report (Field et al., 2014) p.19 states that "estimates of the incremental economic impact of emitting carbon dioxide lie between a few dollars and several hundreds of dollars per tonne of carbon 21 As in the rest of the empirical part, we use the simplification |c 1 ≠ b 1 | π c 2 e b 0 (3.668 tCO2) (robust evidence, medium agreement). Estimates vary strongly with the assumed damage function and discount rate". Table 6 summarizes values of the ratio b 2 c 2 used in the literature. It seems that it has increased over the past years, but that it remains significantly lower than 1 (and than 0.1). (2008) π 1 so that only R and Q are compared Jotzo and Pezzey (2007) b 2 chosen "to be a small constant times" c 2 Uncertainty is then very large for b 2 c 2 , but it is still more likely that this ratio is less than one (and also likely than it is less than 0.1). Therefore, we can be confident that P is the best instrument, superior to R and Q in our 2020-2025 policy framework.
Conclusion
Our model, including three types of uncertainty (on abatement costs, BAU emissions and future economic output, the latter two being correlated), allowed to unify Newell and Pizer (2008) and Sue Wing et al. (2006) frameworks. Two parameters proved to be crucial to rank the three considered policies (tax, fixed cap and relative cap). The first one, related to the Weitzman (1974) literature, is the ratio of slopes of marginal benefit and marginal costs. The lower it is, the more the price instrument is preferred. The second one, related to the Sue Wing et al. (2006) literature, is the correlation between BAU emissions and future economic output. The bigger it is, the more the relative instrument is preferred.
The model allowed displaying the optimal policy in a diagram with each one of these two parameters as an axis, and seeing how this diagram changed when the magnitude of the three considered types of uncertainty changed. Further, we showed that reasoning in terms of abatement costs only and setting environmental benefits aside introduces a bias favoring relative caps, but that this bias was likely to be small in the case of climate change mitigation.
Testing empirically the model led us to the following points. First, as we considered a short-time period policy (2020-2025) and as greenhouse gases are a stock pollutant (so marginal benefits are relatively flatter than marginal costs), tax dominates cap, whether the cap is absolute (Weitzman criterion) or relative to economic output (our own contribution). As mentioned, the tax is often seen as di cult to implement in practice for political reasons, so the policy choice is often narrowed to picking between absolute and intensity targets. Our model allowed us to compare these two policies, whether or not caps were put at their optimum level, which is virtually impossible in practice. Empirical estimation revealed that the situation di ered among countries. Emerging countries (except for Brazil where it is ambiguous) and the United States would be better o with intensity targets, whereas fixed caps would be preferable for Europe and Japan. Admittedly, our model remains simple in its assumptions and other aspects (reviewed in Kim and Baumert (2002) , Marschinski and Edenhofer (2010) and Goulder and Schein (2013) ) have to be considered when determining the choice of an instrument, such as acceptability by population or industry, administrative costs, issues with reporting and verification or carbon price volatility, among others.
As recent evidence in climate science suggests (Matthews et al., 2009) , maintaining the global increase in temperature below two degrees would be closely linked to not exceeding one trillion ton of cumulative carbon emissions at the global level, regardless of the emission trajectory. This notion of "carbon budget" (half being already consumed, and a quarter since 1990) would make a case for a quantity instrument at a global level and in a theoretically infinite temporal horizon. However the implementation of such a "first best" policy would necessitate a temporal and geographical burden sharing of the cap, as well as strong enforcement at the international level, which currently seems far from achievable by international negotiations on climate change.
AppendixA. Simplification
The simplification is:
In Newell and Pizer (2008) , they justify c 1 = b 1 by reasoning around the social optimum.
It implies: .5) with ‹ 2 x π 1.
with ‹ 2 x π 1.
AppendixB. Optimal price instrument proof
Remplacing directly e by p leads to a too complicated formula. First we rewrite T SC e with e ú :
Then we have:
The regulator chooses p ú in order to minimize expected total social costs:
We find:
AppendixC. Optimal relative cap instrument proof
Replacing e by r(x b 0 +Á x ) in T SC e (written with e*) gives:
The regulator chooses r ú so as to minimize expected total social costs:
, we have:
AppendixD. Absolute or Relative caps proof
We have:
As the second factor is always positive (for fl ex > 0), we conclude to
AppendixE. Prices versus relative caps proof
Noting
we have (see equation (D.4)):
We first rewrite Q≠P (equation (9)) in a similar way:
The right term is a degree 2 polynom in fl ex with a discriminant:
D > 0 when b 2 < c 2 (which is a relevant domain because when b 2 > c 2 , P is dominated by Q so it cannot be the optimal instrument).
The roots are:
One root is always negative because -x > 1. Therefore we conclude that: 
AppendixF. Diagram changes proof
With To ease calculus we need to express the formulas with di erent notations. We note • An increase of ‹ c always favors P over R (ˆf (›) ‹ c > 0)
• When b 2 c 2 is close to one (› close to 0 or A ›,c,e close to 1); an increase of ‹ x supports P over R (ˆf (›) ‹ x > 0, but an increase of ‹ e favors R over P (ˆf (›) ‹ e < 0)
• When b 2 c 2 is close to zero, it is possible that the situation is opposite (an increase of ‹ x supports R over P and an increase of ‹ e favors P over R), but in each case it depends on the value of parameters ‹ x , ‹ c and ‹ e . More specifically:
• For an increase of ‹ x , it is the case if ‹ • For an increase of ‹ x , it is the case if • ‹ x is much higher for 2010 (crisis) in Western countries, but in the same order of magnitude for BRIC countries.
• ‹ e is higher for 2010 (crisis) for both Western and BRIC countries
• fl ex is higher for 2010 (crisis) for both Western (especially Japan and the US) and BRIC countries 
